Post-Quantum Cryptography in Future Network Security

Abstract

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) addresses the imminent threat posed by quantum computers to modern cryptographic systems—particularly those based on integer factorization and discrete logarithms. The advent of Shor’s algorithm invalidates widely used schemes like RSA and ECC, mandating a shift to quantum-resistant algorithms. PQC encompasses several mathematical paradigms—including lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial systems—each offering resilience against both classical and quantum attacks. This paper investigates the potential for integrating PQC into future network infrastructures, focusing on wireless and wired communications. We review key standardization efforts, notably NIST's multi-round selection process that commenced in 2016 and considered algorithms such as NewHope, CRYSTALS-Kyber, and SPHINCS+ . We examine practical experiments such as Google’s CECPQ1, combining classical and quantum-safe key exchange in TLS . Challenges related to performance, key sizes, and resource constraints—especially in IoT contexts—are analyzed. Through simulated network evaluations, we explore computational overhead, latency, and ciphertext expansion in PQC deployment. This leads to recommendations for cryptographic agility, including phased migration and hybrid schemes . Results indicate that while PQC introduces overhead, careful design and optimization can mitigate performance penalties. We discuss the trade-offs between security, efficiency, and interoperability. Finally, we propose a workflow for transitioning network systems toward PQC, outline future improvements, and emphasize the necessity of continued research in standardization, implementation security, and agile cryptographic frameworks.